hilzoy, from the blog "Obsidian Wings," has written what I believe to be an incredibly astute characerization of the predicament that is the Iraq War. If you don't read a thing, at least listen to the YouTube of the Army Wife pleading for a draft so the military can quit disintegrating and get a break.
Rather than ramble on, I'll let you read an excerpt, and then you can continue on with the link I have provided.
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Thirteen Ways Not To Think About The Petraeus Report, by hilzoy
In anticipation of the Petraeus report, I've put thirteen* ways not to think about it below the fold.
* (OK, actually only eight. But how could I not invoke Wallace Stevens?)
(1) "The surge is working; we should maintain it until we've done the job." -- This is not an option. Fred Kaplan:
"Adm. Michael Mullen, the incoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified at his confirmation hearings last month that the "surge" in Iraq could not be sustained at present levels past April 2008.
There are a few ways to remedy this shortfall, all of them impractical or infeasible. First, soldiers' tours of duty in Iraq, which were recently extended from 12 months to 15 months, could be stretched further to 18 months. However, Gen. Richard Cody, the Army's vice chief of staff, told me, during a recent interview for a separate story, that this idea is "off the table." As it should be: The relentless rotation cycles have already compelled many soldiers and junior officers to quit the Army; pushing duty and tolerance much further might not just exhaust the troops beyond limits but spark an exodus from the armed forces."
This means that the surge will end next April. When we ask ourselves whether or not to maintain it until then, we should recognize that the only question worth asking is: will keeping the extra troops there until April improve matters? Asking whether it would improve matters to keep them there in perpetuity, or "until we get the job done", is beside the point: we can't.
(2) Even if we can't maintain the surge, we're making progress, so we should stay. -- This is an example of what, on Obsidian Wings, I called "benefit analysis": noting that an option provides some benefit and concluding that we should adopt it. (Relatedly, "cost analysis" involves noting that an option involves some cost and concluding that we should not adopt it.) In making decisions, we need to consider the pros and the cons.
In the case of keeping our troops in Iraq, there are obvious costs. Our soldiers are dying. Iraqis are dying. We are spending enormous amounts of money. This YouTube clip of a military wife calling Bill Kristol on CSPAN will get some of them across:
Army Wife Pleading to Bill Kristol for a Draft to Give Military a Break
(3) Our army can handle it. -- Besides the deaths of our troops and of Iraqis, the injuries, the displaced people, and the immense strain on everyone -- American, Iraqi, British, you name it -- who is involved with this war, we are also breaking our army. Over two years ago, Phil Carter and Owen West reported that the Army was trying to solve its recruiting problems by letting in people with criminal records, substance abuse problems, and so forth:
"Now comes a new Army directive that attempts to alleviate the personnel crunch by retaining soldiers who are earmarked for early discharge during their first term of enlistment because of alcohol or drug abuse, unsatisfactory performance, or being overweight, among other reasons. By retaining these soldiers, the Army lowers the quality of its force and places a heavy burden on commanders who have to take the poor performers into harm's way. This is a quick fix that may create more problems than it solves."
A year and a half ago,
Salon reported:
"Waivers, which are generally approved at the Pentagon, allow recruiters to sign up men and women who otherwise would be ineligible for service because of legal convictions, medical problems or other reasons preventing them from meeting minimum standards. (...)
According to statistics provided to Salon by the office of the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, the Army said that 17 percent (21,880 new soldiers) of its 2005 recruits were admitted under waivers. Put another way, more soldiers than are in an entire infantry division entered the Army in 2005 without meeting normal standards. This use of waivers represents a 42 percent increase since the pre-Iraq year of 2000."
The Army is shedding officers at an alarming rate. Last year, 44% of the West Point class that became eligible to leave the army did so -- "the service's highest loss rate in three decades." We have already done enormous damage to our armed forces, and the longer we stay in Iraq, the worse it will get.
(5) But -- but -- look what's happening in Anbar province! It's real progress! -- Yes, it is. It's debatable whether or not it's due to the surge, but let's assume, for the sake of argument, that it is. The question remains: what is going to happen when we leave Anbar province? One possibility is that the Iraqi government will embrace all the Sunni militias who have worked with us, allow them to continue to fight al Qaeda in Iraq, and provide them with the arms and supplies they need to do so. In this case, the "Anbar Awakening" would really have accomplished something.
However, it is completely unclear whether or not that will happen. Anthony Cordesman (pdf):
"Key tribal leaders, and the main tribal confederation in the area have started to fight Al Qa’ida, have turned to US forces for help, and seem willing to strike a bargain with the Shi’ite-dominated central government if the government will give them money, a reasonable degree of de facto Sunni autonomy, and incorporate their fighters into auxiliary police forces, the regular police, and Iraqi Army. Sunnis in other areas are considering similar deals, although such Sunni support of the US and central government is uncertain and dependent on far more action from the central government than has occurred to date."
If the government does not integrate the Sunnis we are working with into the army and police, or at least continue to supply them, then once we leave, they will lose the capacity to resist al Qaeda in Iraq, and the gains in Anbar will evaporate. So how is this integration going? Not so good:
"Many Sunni leaders here contend that the Shiite-dominated government is neglecting them for sectarian reasons, and the bad feelings at times boil over into angry accusations. In interviews conducted in early August, some said that factions in the Interior Ministry were taking orders from Iran, or that the government was withholding money and support because it did not want to build up Sunni security forces that it could end up fighting after an eventual American withdrawal from Iraq.
Iraqi officials in Baghdad deny shortchanging Falluja, saying they have authorized more than enough police forces for Anbar. ''We'd like to support them, but that does not mean we can respond to their requests or demands,'' said Sadiq al-Rikabi, political adviser to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. He said the government had problems supplying the police throughout Iraq. (...)
If the Iraqi government provided a large and steady supply of men, weapons, vehicles and equipment, the police could secure the city, said Colonel Hussein, the Falluja police chief. But he complained of little support from the government except for salaries, which he doubted would be paid if the Americans were not here. He said he also needed four times more policemen. ''Without the role of the Marines, I'll fail,'' he said.
Brig. Gen. Abdul Karim Khalaf, a senior Interior Ministry spokesman, called Colonel Hussein's comments ''unprofessional.'' In an interview, he said if the Falluja police had an equipment shortage then they failed to request enough gear earlier.
He added that if Colonel Hussein is so fond of the Marines, perhaps he should apply for American citizenship."
Another story about attempts to enroll Sunnis in the Iraqi police:
"In all, [Lt. Col. Kurt] Pinkerton marshaled 2,400 men willing to become policemen, but the Interior Ministry agreed to accept 1,700 of them, at a salary of $600 a month. When it came time to enroll, Pinkerton realized that 23 percent of the names he had submitted had been changed by the Iraqi government -- raising his suspicion that officials want to disrupt his efforts. "Who are they?" he wondered. "And where'd they come from?""
Along with the Iraqi government's general ineptitude, the problem is that the Shi'a in charge of Iraq are very worried about arming the Sunnis in Anbar provice, for the understandable reason that they might end up fighting those Sunnis in a civil war. The problem is that this could be a self-fulfilling prophecy: Shi'a in the government are too fearful to integrate the Sunnis into the armed forces and police, and as a result, the Sunnis conclude that trying to work with the central government is a lost cause. If that happens, then we will have taken some AQI fighters out of action, which is good, but we will also have trained Sunnis who will fight against the Iraqi government in a civil war, which is very bad.
Moreover, they have no real incentive to let the Sunnis in:
""It's always easy to get the prospective loser in a civil war to agree to a cease-fire," said Stephen Biddle, a counterinsurgency expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who has advised military commanders in Iraq. Sunnis are a minority and far more open to switching loyalties if it ensures them a future stake in governing Iraq, he said.
"It's a lot tougher to get the prospective winner to agree to a cease-fire," Biddle said, referring to the majority Shiites. "Getting them to sign on is going to be harder because they see themselves in ascendancy.""
Or, in the words of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate:
"Such initiatives, if not fully exploited by the Iraqi Government, could over time also shift greater power to the regions, undermine efforts to impose central authority, and
reinvigorate armed opposition to the Baghdad government." (Emphasis added.)
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hilzoy has written much more that is so enlightening. Also, if you go to her site, she has links to all of her sources within her article.
Y'all know how much I love to talk, but really what more is there to say? There's no need to expound upon what has already said it all.
Elphaba
hilzoy's Thirteen Ways